Is terrorism a successful form of political violence?
In 2001, the phrase, “the terrorists have won” appeared hundreds of times across US magazines and newspapers in the two months following 9/11. To many, victory seemed to lie with the perpetrators—the terrorists. But were they successful? To what extent? As a form of political violence, terrorism is, in essence, a violent method used to instigate fear in order to effect political change. Intended to change decision-maker policy or even the behaviour of wider society, this violence comes in many forms, from bombing to assassinations, shootings to kidnappings. Terrorism is not, however, the only form of political violence that seeks to cause change, and its effectiveness must be called into question. As Crenshaw notes, “Efficacy is the primary standard by which terrorism is compared with other methods of achieving political goals.” Under direct analysis of political violence, its many methods, and a number of scholarly studies, it will be shown that terrorism it is not an empirically successful form of political violence as it often fails at obtaining long term strategic, political goals. Moreover, by comparing the relative success of terrorism to other forms of political violence—like guerrilla warfare—the argument for effectiveness becomes an even more strenuous one. This will be proven first by attempting to define terrorism, political violence, and relative ‘success’. Following this, a discussion of the debate between scholars over the relative effectiveness of terrorism will be had. Finally, terrorism as a form of political violence will be compared to another form: guerrilla warfare.
Definitions
It is infamously difficult to define terrorism, to the point that it has become a near cliché amongst the scholarly community. The debate has ranged widely, from active involvement in defining it for use, to such arguments like, “terrorism cannot be defined”, “a definition would be too limiting”, and “I know it when I see it”. Regardless, there has been no single definition scholars can agree on, and often the definitions that do manage to encompass the broad range of terrorist activities end up being so long-winded that they are wholly impractical when put to use. However, according to Schmid and Jongman’s survey of over 100 definitions, three elements appear in the majority: violence; emphasison terror or fear (often towards a wide audience); and political motivation. For the purpose of this essay, terrorism will be defined along these three elements as: ‘the use of violence, often against civilians, by non-state actors in order to attain political goals.’
Political violence, just like terrorism, is multifaceted and complex because it covers a wide variety of phenomena. There are many forms of violence, but the term ‘political’ is used to distinguish the difference between the political motivations for violence from those associated with criminal activities or internal conflicts for economic gain. Examples of such violence can be seen in civil war, genocide, insurgency, and, of course, terrorism. Perhaps the most compelling definitions that encapsulates the phenomenon is given by Harold Nieburg, an American political scientist who describes it as:
“Acts of disruption, destruction, and injury whose purpose, choice of targets or victims, surrounding circumstances, implementation and/or effects have political significance, that is, tend to modify the behaviour of others who bargain for settlements which have certain impacts on the social system.”
Terrorism and political violence, then, are intrinsically linked through politics. Terrorism seeks to shape political behaviour through attacks, and is therefore a form of political violence. But importantly, terrorism has a specific place within political violence. It is the last form of what James A. Miller terms a “low-intensity conflict”. According to Miller, terrorism is incomparable to other forms of political violence like coup d’etat, revolution (guerrilla) or civil wars, because it does not achieve a degree of violence that is comparable. It is often used, however, in combination with the aforementioned forms. There is a lack of control in terrorism—its purpose it to simply create terror to shape political behaviour.
When it comes to terrorism’s success and effectiveness, no consensus exists. Many scholars have argued that it is (for loss of a better phrase), “in the eye of the beholder”. Here, public fear or a heavy-handed response from the victim government may represent a victory in itself. Moreover, as Krause argues, the terrorist group may be effective fulfilling the distinct motives of the individual members within the terrorist organisation. In fact, the ongoing survival of any given organisation and its continued fight to keep itself relevant may also be a triumph, as it validates that members are rationally choosing an option that seems better than their given alternative. Although valid additions to the debate, these arguments present ‘success’ as a means to an end—not an end in itself. The end, rather, can be scientifically and empirically defined. For the purpose of this essay, the successful end of a terrorist cause is the fulfilment of their stated strategic, political goal(s).
Efficacy
9/11 was a watershed moment in terrorism studies, and in the aftermath a flurry of scholars emphasized the effectiveness of terrorism. By focussing on concessions to Palestinian terrorism, Alan Dershowitz, for example, argues that terrorism has increased because it is effective. While critics decried his polemic as unscientific, the immediate issue with it is that he makes a direct correlation between increased terrorism and effectiveness; it only takes a decline in terrorism to disprove it. Although delivered in hindsight from the future, his assumption is proven wrong as terrorism has steadily declined since 2014. Based on the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 2018 report, there has been a 43 percent decrease in terrorist attacks and a 48 percent decrease in deaths since 2014.
Robert Pape, on the other hand, provides a more systematic, evidence based argument that suicide terrorism is effective because terrorists have learned that it pays. Suicide terrorist’s readiness to die, he continues, both amplifies the destructiveness of an individual attack and sends an intensely credible signal that there is a commitment to further attacks. The effectiveness, he calculates, achieves “significant policy changes by the target toward the terrorists’ major political goals” about 53% of the time, or, more accurately, in 6 out of 11 campaigns. Although seeming highly effective, Pape’s argument has been challenged on a number of issues. Firstly, his sample size of 11 cases has 10 within the same three state conflicts. Moreover, the exclusion of ongoing campaigns—which might be therefore counted as failures due to lack of accomplishment—would bring his success rate down to a much lower 24 percent. Although suicide terrorism has continued to grow, there is scant evidence to prove that the effectiveness of suicide terrorism can then be translated to broader suicide.
Whereas scientific and empirical studies have been lacking from one side of the debate, a number of scholars supporting ineffectiveness use statistical and quantitative evidence back their claims. In his study of 42 terrorist cases, Abrahm finds only 3 (7%) where terrorists realised their policy objectives. Cronin, moreover, finds the success rate is less than 5 percent. Furthermore, Jones and Libicki conclude—from a comprehensive statistical analysis of terrorist groups since 1968—that only “10 percent of the terrorist groups that ended did so because they had achieved their goals... There is rarely a causal link between the use of terrorism and the achievement of its goals.”
There are a number of explanations for these statistics. Chief among them is that governments will commonly resist complying when their own citizens are under attack. No matter how governments understand a terrorist groups’ aims, the extremeness of the methods (civilian targeting) used to elicit or provoke political change indicates inherently dangerous political intentions. Rather than raising cognizance of their grievances and attempting to make themselves seem legitimate, instead the violence of terrorists makes them seem extreme and ruins any bargaining power.
This also links to Abrahms’ argument that terrorism’s main failure is miscommunication. When objectives are made clear, governments and civilians will commonly ignore them, due to the belief that an attack was an end in itself. Even when the objectives are ambiguous, the target government assumes that attacks on civilians is an attempt to destroy the country’s values or society. This ruins any chance of public sympathy for the cause, and instead has a reverse reaction. Furthermore, attacks make the group seem weak and desperate.
In essence, terrorist attacks decrease the bargaining and coercive power of terrorists, and very rarely do they succeed because of it. If ever they do accomplish their political goals, it is often not because of their actions: “in most cases, terrorism had little or nothing to do with the outcome.”
Political Violence Comparatives
If terrorism is a form of political violence, it’s relative success must also be measured against that of other forms of political violence. By juxtaposing another, similar form of political violence, we can shed light on terrorism’s relative efficacy.
Among political violence’s many forms, guerrilla warfare is one of the most similar and symbiotic to terrorism, and it is also categorised into Miller’s “low-intensity conflict” under ‘insurgency’, making it the perfect example to use. However, the two forms of violence can often be confused because terrorists sometimes characterise their operations as the guerrilla operations, and terrorist groups may “escalate to insurgency or even conventional war.” Guerrilla warfare does not reject terrorist acts, but uses them in reservation.
As Cronin writes, “terrorism and insurgency are not the same, but they are related.” The difference between the two is that, as the name suggests, guerrilla warfare is a clear, definite pattern of war, while terrorism is generally more sporadic. Whereas terrorist groups tend to be smaller, seeking to destroy morale, not gain military victory, guerrilla groups tend to be larger, working towards military victory and attempting to establish physical control of a territory. Perhaps the biggest dissimilarity, however, is that, as Abrahms contends, guerrilla groups “mostly attack military and diplomatic targets, such as military assets, diplomatic personnel and police forces.”
By relating terrorism to guerrilla warfare, Abrahms cites RAND's MIPT Terrorism Incident database which found that the latter was considerably more likely to coerce political policy and complete either partial or full political objectives. Returning to Pape’s 2003 study, Abrahms further claims that most of the cases were not terrorist campaigns, but rather guerrilla campaigns. “Unlike guerrilla warfare, terrorism is a losing political tactic.”
Guerrilla warfare also aims for popular legitimacy. In his book Invisible Armies, Boot explains that since 1945, guerrillas have been growing more and more successful in part due to their ability to play on public opinion—something terrorists have trouble doing. As Chenoweth and Stephan confirm, government repression of political violence can be justified to the public and the international community with more ease when dealing with terrorists rather than guerrillas, who may in fact have some form of support from society.
Compared to guerrilla tactics, the evidence is convincing: terrorism is a poor method of attaining political and strategic goals. Success stories are overwhelmingly the exception, rather than the rule. Even when strategic victory is achieved, it is often not from the use of terrorist attacks, but rather from a “transition into more traditional means of political coercion, such as insurgent attacks on military forces.” Not only does terrorism have a statistically low chance of success, within the realm of political violence it is also the lowest common denominator.
Conclusion
In order to prove that terrorism is ineffective and unsuccessful, this essay has shown that terrorists rarely fulfil their long-term political, strategic goals. Moreover, it has also proven that—not only is terrorism simply not effective—it is not a successful form of political violence. In juxtaposing terrorism with another relevant form of political violence (guerrilla warfare), terrorism on its own pales in comparison. Using a litany of sources from the ever-growing debate, the foundations of these assumptions lie in scientific, empirical and quantifiable data. While exceptions to this data exists, this does not repudiate the overwhelming fact that non-combatant attacks on civilians reliably and consistently fail to change political policy. Regardless, the persistence of terrorism depends completely on the perception of those engaging in it. As Lutz and Lutz put it: “As long as groups believe that such violence can work – even if they are wrong – they will be tempted to adopt the technique in pursuance of their goals.”
